Genesis of the Crisis
A detailed examination of the background to this crisis and of the political and diplomatic manoeuvrings that occurred is beyond the scope of this study. These issues have been addressed elsewhere. 4 However, a basic introduction is required in order to understand the context in which military planning took place. British interest in
Iranian oil dated back to 1901 when the first concession to drill for oil in Iran was 2 granted. In 1908 major reserves were discovered in the south and by 1913 these were being carried by pipeline to a refinery on the island of Abadan. 5 In 1933 the AngloIranian Oil Company, negotiated a sixty-year concession to extract oil and built-up the facilities at Abadan into the largest refinery in the world. By 1951 the AIOC had 70,000 Iranian and 4500 British employees. Working conditions for the former, while better than those of most Iranians, were in no way comparable to the far superior conditions enjoyed by their European counterparts. This was the cause of resentment in Iran and of moral discomfort amongst some Labour politicians.
In 1950 the AIOC made profits of £170 million, of which the British Government took thirty per cent in tax . 6 Under the 1933 concession the Iranian Government asset. Neither the AIOC nor the UK government was willing to give way on either issue until it was too late. 8 Strikes and riots were not uncommon at Abadan. In 1946 the British had deployed an Indian brigade and a Royal Navy cruiser to nearby Basra in Iraq when a general strike halted oil production and threatened the safety of AIOC staff. 9 In the tense political atmosphere that existed in Iran at this time disturbances were inevitable. Political violence occurred across the country and in February 1951 the Prime Minister Ali Razmara was assassinated by religious extremists. Abadan was hit by a series of strikes amid agitation by nationalists and the communist Tudeh Party. Serious rioting on 12 April resulted in the death of three British subjects with six more injured. The following day the British Chiefs of Staff, the professional heads of the army, air force and navy, decided to send the Royal Navy cruiser HMS Gambia to the Gulf as a precautionary measure. Fortunately, Iranian troops were able to restore order in Abadan but the potential requirement for military intervention in order to protect
British lives was to figure prominently in future British planning.
The dominant Iranian figure in this crisis was Dr Mohammed Mussaddiq 10 .
Mussaddiq was the ageing but charismatic leader of the nationalist National Front. Unfortunately, many of these ships were held in reserve or conducting trials and training, including all of the battleships and all but four of the aircraft carriers. Like the army, the Royal Navy had a range of commitments around the globe that it was struggling to meet. In particular, the deployment of a large maritime force to the west coast of Korea reduced the availability of both ships and trained manpower elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the ability of the navy to control the sea in the Persian Gulf was not 6 seriously open to question given the meagre assets available to Iran. The ability to exploit that control and to project power from the sea was more problematic.
Royal Navy cruisers and destroyers could bombard targets in Abadan, but the circumstances in which they might be called to do so appeared limited. Bombarding the oil refinery or its environs could do little in itself to achieve government aims. The RAF had airfields at Bahrain and Sharjah both of which were British administered territories in the Persian Gulf and also at Habbaniya and Shaiba in Iraq.
The latter were reinforced during the crisis.
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Military Planning
Even before the Nationalisation Law was passed the British Foreign Secretary, A plan already existed to cater for the protection of lives and property at Abadan.
Code-named Accleton, this plan was based around the air-lift of an infantry brigade, minus one battalion, to Shaiba from whence they could rapidly move to Abadan should the situation demand it. 28 The plan was designed to meet a local internal security problem and was based upon the assumption that Iranian forces would not 9 oppose British intervention. It also assumed the availability of facilities in Iraq and could not be implemented satisfactorily without use of Shaiba. 29 At their meeting on 27 March the Chiefs of Staff concluded that if these assumptions proved to be invalid then alternatives to Accleton would be required.
The Chiefs agreed that the protection of both Abadan and the oilfield area could not be afforded except at 'serious cost to our global strategy both in peace and war'.
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Even with the cooperation of Iranian forces an entire division would be required.
Without such cooperation a larger force would be necessary. They noted that even if 
Bold and Quick Action?
Initially, elements within the UK armed forces appeared willing to countenance great risks in order to achieve swift and decisive action to secure Abadan. 51 An additional problem was that no British troops in the Middle East were trained in amphibious operations. 52 The land approach was politically vulnerable as it required unrestricted access through Iraq and this could not be guaranteed. 53 It also appears to have neglected the fact that any military force advancing on Abadan by land would still have to cross the Shatt al Arab, presumably in the same ships and boats that would have been used in an amphibious landing.
Military plans were not limited to protecting British lives but also included a requirement to protect property and interests. Three plans existed:
1. Plan Midget: designed to cover the evacuation of British and other friendly nationals should there seem a prospect that their lives might be in danger.
2. Plan X: to seize and hold Abadan Island in the face of Iranian opposition.
3. Plan Y: to seize and hold both Abadan Island and the oilfields inland in order to ensure the resumption of oil production and export.
All three plans assumed the active opposition of Iranian forces which were described The military planners were concerned that activating Midget might have the opposite effect to that which was desired. There was a danger that the overt move of troops to Shaiba prior to their arrival at Abadan would provoke disturbances on the island that would pose a serious threat to British lives before arrival of the first troops. 57 It was also noted that the requirement to meet the threat of a British landing might cause the Iranian security forces to neglect their obligation to protect foreign nationals. 58 It was later agreed that a detachment of infantry should be maintained on a cruiser anchored close off Abadan. Poised offshore on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al Arab and available at a moments notice these troops could at least provide some form of military presence ashore prior to the arrival of the main force. Once preliminary moves and redistributions had been completed it would still take between six and eight weeks for the leading wave of any force to reach Abadan and the full force could not concentrate there in less than four months.
The COS appeared well aware of political complications. They noted that even should UK forces succeed in seizing the oilfields and refinery intact, it was by no means certain that any Iranian personnel would be willing to work in them. The military appear to have been rather less hawkish than some of their political leaders. The
Chiefs concluded that:
In the circumstances as they are to-day…there is in our view no certainty that this major military operation, involving a commitment of indefinite duration, would have any effect that might not equally well be achieved by political and economic measures -principally the withholding of tanker and marketing facilities.
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Preparing for Action
A key constraint for the military planners was the availability of shipping to transport troops and equipment. In late March the cruiser HMS Gambia had arrived in the Gulf and joined two frigates already stationed there. 63 Conditions onboard the cruiser, at anchor and without air conditioning, were very difficult. On 5 May Gambia was relieved by HMS Mauritius which, in turn, was relieved by the cruiser HMS Euryalus in early July. 64 The heavy guns of these cruisers made them very potent fire support platforms 65 but they were not ideally suited to transporting large numbers of troops and equipment, nor were they equipped to land them in a tactical formation. For this purpose amphibious shipping would be required. Unfortunately, the provision of Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs), the navy's primary amphibious vessel, was a cause of concern. The Amphibious Warfare Squadron created in 1951 should have been capable of providing lift for a battalion group at short notice and a brigade group after thirty days. Unfortunately, the Squadron was based at Malta and it would take some time before any of its slow ships could complete the journey through the Suez Canal to the Gulf. A further problem was that many of the LSTs required for Plan Y had not had their decks stiffened and thus could not safely carry the army's new heavy Centurion tanks. 66 Prior to the crisis the Royal Navy had no amphibious ships or craft in the Gulf. The LST HMS Messina sailed from Malta for the Gulf on 16 centigrade. Reportedly, all of the cockroaches on board died and all of the flies flew away. These beneficial side effects were mitigated by the fact that the ship's cat, 'Snowy', had to be put down after becoming literally like 'a cat on hot bricks'. The scalding decks and bulwarks could also be a hazard to human health. 68 The potential employment of HMS Messina was also rather hazardous. In the case of operations at Abadan it was to carry 150 tons of stores, ammunition, vehicles and equipment down the Shatt al Arab to Abadan. It would also embark infantry brought forward from the airfield at Shaiba. Unfortunately, the eastern bank of the river was Iranian territory and therefore the passage downstream could be opposed. In order to meet this eventuality, anti-tank guns were secured to the port side of the ship. These, in conjunction with the vessel's own anti-aircraft guns and the light machine guns and mortars of the embarked force, were designed to suppress any opposition. The shallow draft of the LST made it a useful vessel for riverine operations.
Unfortunately, these ships did not carry any heavy armament nor did they have any armour. As such they were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. It is remarkable that only two years after the Amethyst incident the Royal Navy was willing to consider sailing such a vulnerable vessel, packed with troops and equipment, in an opposed passage down river within sight and range of enemy forces.
It was not just the vulnerability of LSTs that was a cause of concern. Their availability was also a critical factor. In late June the Joint Planning Staff reported that although 16 LSTs were available in the UK and the Mediterranean it would take 30 days for the first one to reinforce Messina in the Gulf. To make matters worse only two more could arrive within less than two months. The majority of LSTs held in reserve or refitting in the UK could not reach the Gulf before September and some could not be made available before November. 69 By the end of the month the Chiefs of Staff were able to report that if preliminary action was ordered by 2 July the leading elements of a UK force could reach Abadan by about 19 August. This was not a particularly rapid response. To make matters worse, such preliminary action could not be covert. The commissioning of the necessary amphibious ships would require the immobilisation of ten destroyers and frigates and two minesweepers. Men would have to be transferred from the Reserve Fleet and reservists would have to be recalled to service. The army would require an additional 10,000 men to bring the necessary forces to full strength and this would require the recall of reservists, the retention of regular troops due to leave and an extension of overseas tours. The government would also have to charter a number of civilian aircraft. 70 
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The need to overtly re-commission mothballed amphibious ships and to recall reservists meant that such preparatory moves could not be kept secret. Thirteen additional Hastings were sent to Egypt, arriving between 5 July and 7 July.
In addition 10 civilian York airliners belonging to BOAC and the Lancashire Aircraft
Corporation were chartered along with their crew. The aircraft were to carry RAF markings and the aircrew received temporary commissions. This removed restrictions that applied to civilian but not military flights into the Canal Zone. Due to congestion in Egypt the Yorks were based in Libya at Castel Benito, where they were near to their proposed passengers, the 1 st Guards Brigade. 74 As a result it became possible to air lift three battalions forward on D-Day, two more on D+4 and a sixth unit by D+6.
With the arrival in the Gulf at the end of July of War Department LSTs pre-loaded with heavy equipment, Midget could be implemented at short notice. 75 On 25 June Slim had informed the Cabinet that it would take 36 hours to put Midget into effect. This could be reduced to 12 hours if the forces were assembled in advance. It could be reduced still further if they were flown forward to Iraq. The
Cabinet approved the concentration of forces in Egypt (Canal Zone) but deferred a decision about moving troops to Iraq. 76 This restriction did not apply to the pre-positioning of HMS Messina at Basra. 77 Ministers later agreed to the limited prepositioning of troops and stores at Shaiba but only on the basis that these were kept to the absolute minimum required for advance parties and the maintenance of stores and that they must in no circumstances include formed units. 78 The problem facing the British was that in order to protect British lives it was important to get sufficient troops ashore at the first opportunity. Troops held offshore in the cruiser could land at very short notice and could be supported by the ships guns once ashore. However, there would not be enough of them to guarantee the safety of "BUCCANEER" will be ordered in the immediate future'. 79 In the event, no infantry battalions deployed to Iraq although the RAF did deploy fighter/ground attack aircraft at Shaiba and Habbaniya.
It is noteworthy that throughout the crisis the Royal Navy did not deploy an aircraft carrier to the northern Gulf. In 1951-2 the Navy had 15 carriers, of which four were on active service. 80 On 30 
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As a result it was decided that although there could be no question of conducting Plan Y against the existing government the plan should be adjusted to enable it to provide support for that government in the event of a Soviet attack or communist coup. 92 In reality, despite the change in rationale, the plan remained largely unaffected, focusing on control of Abadan and the oil areas. 93 Such action might create a stable enclave for forces loyal to the Shah, but the military planners were well aware that control of the oil areas might still be rather hard to represent as disinterested assistance against a communist insurgency.
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Plan Buccaneer
As the build-up of forces continued the British military position improved. As a result, on 18 June the Minister of Fuel and Power suggested that Abadan might be taken and held indefinitely, operating with oil imported from Kuwait. He also wanted consideration to be given to holding Abadan long enough to remove the 1 million tons of oil estimated to be stored there. 95 The idea was examined by the Chiefs of
Staff and the Cs-in-C were informed that, should Midget be met by very limited
Iranian opposition, they should be prepared to reinforce and maintain the Midget forces with the object of remaining in Abadan. 96 As a result by early July there were four plans for military intervention: Move of forces to Abadan to cover the evacuation of friendly AIOC employees and dependents in the face of opposition by Iranian Forces.
Phase Two. To remain in Abadan to safeguard British lives and property.
Later a third phase was added, to provide for the reinforcement of phase one and/or two should they require it. Both Disciple and Lethal required a scale of forces that the British would have struggled to provide. The Cabinet were not willing to sanction the overt military preparations that would be required to prepare for operations on this scale. As a result both plans were abandoned and in late July the Cs-in-C were informed that Buccaneer was the only plan that need be 'kept in mind'. In view of the political and military difficulties associated with intervention the Cabinet agreed on 12 July that military action in Iran, on a larger scale than that necessary for the protection of British lives, should not be contemplated unless there was a fundamental change in the situation there. 107 As military preparations for Buccaneer continued some civilian and military leaders continued to press for more robust action to protect property as well as lives. 
